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holder does not create a vacancy. 2 Held: reversed with instructions to
dismiss. The court had no jurisdiction to review by appeal the appoint-
ment by the Board. Board of County CommWrs. of Dearborn Co. v.
Droge, 68 N.E. (2d) 650 (Ind. 1946).
The Board did not declare a vacancy, but merely flled it. Its
action was purely ministerial,s and no appeal from it will lie, since not
specifically authorized by statute.4 If no vacancy existed, the Board's
action was improper and can be tested in a proper action. 5
The policy of many states is declared by constitutional or stat-
utory provision precluding the insane from public office.6 The pro-
tection of public interests requires that an office be considered vacant
when the incumbent is completely incapacitated by insanity from per-
forming his non-delegable duties.7
TAXATION
STATE TAXATION OF LEASEHOLD INTEREST IN PROPERTY
OWNED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Recent disproval of property by the federal government, on lease
and conditional sales terms, has sharply focused the problems inherent
in the broad principle that federally owned property is exempt from
state taxation.' Included in the question whether a state may tax a
leasehold interest possessed by a person, otherwise not tax exempt, when
the lessor is the United States. The solution to the above is dependent
upon the answer to the following questions:
a. May a leasehold interest in tax exempt property be sep-
arated from the interest of the owner in fee for tax purposes?
b. Where the federal government owns the reversion, would
such a tax be prohibited by the implied immunity of the federal
government from state taxation?
2. 66 N.E.(2d) 134 (Ind. App. 1946).
3. State v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434, 16 N.E. 384 (1887), 3 Am. St. Rep.
663 (1888).
4. State v. Circuit Court, 214 Ind. 323, 15 N.E.(2d) 624 (1938); Bun-
nell v. Board, 124 Ind. 1, 24 N.E. 370 (1889); Platter v. Board, 103
Ind. 360, 2 N.E. 544 (1885); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 65-106.
5. The proper procedure would be for the claimant to the office to
file an information in the nature of quo warranto as set forth
in Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 3-2001 to 3-2014, and described
in McGuirk v. State, 201 Ind. 650, 169 N.E. 521 (1930).
6. Illustrative constitutional provisions are: Minn. Const. Art VII, § 2;
Nebr. Const. Art. I1, § 23; R. I. Const. Art. II, § 4 and Art. IX,
§ 1. The statutes usually disqualify a general class of persons,
and the insane are included in that class by court interpretation:
e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 446.010 (27); Mass. G. L. 1932,
c. 211, § 4.
7. in re Killeen, 121 Misc. 482, 201 N.Y. Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
People v. Robb, 33 N. Y. S. R. 808, 11 N.Y. Supp. 383 (Sup. Ct.
1890).
1. See Rice, "Problems of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Arising
out of Federal Contract Termination and Property Disposal" (1945)
54 Yale L. J. 665.
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NOTES AND. COMMENTS
Every property owner holds his interest subject to taxation by the
state.2 Although generally there can be but one assessment on an en-
tire estate in realty, where the reversion is exempt the leasehold may
be separately assessed.S Indiana specifically provides that such leasehold
interests shall be taxed as real property.4
A state cannot direbtly tax property or the operations of an instru-
mentality of the federal government. 5  Although application of this
concept has not been without difficulty, the trend is to restrict the scope
of implied immunity.0 For example, a state formerly could not tax
purchasers, under conditional sales contract with the federal government,
until title had been transferred from the federal government.7  How-
ever, in recent cases it has been held that a state may tax thei vendee's
equitable or beneficial interest while the legal title was still in the
United States.8 The fact that public property may be sold for more
if exempted from taxation for a time has not been considered sufficient
cause to grant immunity o The tax imposed on the beneficial interest,
2. "Everything to which the legislative power extends may be the
subject of taxation, whether it be person or property, or possession,
franchise or privilege, or occupation or right." 1 Cooley, "Taxation"
(4th ed. 1924) §71. See Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah
County, 169 U.S. 421, 427 (1898).
3. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 277, 55
P. (2d) 891 (1936); Chicago v. University of Chicago, 302 Ill. 455,
134 N.E. 723 (1922), 23 A.L.R. 244, 248 (1923); Trimble v. Seattle,
64 Wash. 102, 116 Pac. 647 (1911), aff'd, 231 U.S. 683 (1914);
accord, Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, 122 W.Va. 483, 10
S.E. (2d) 901 (1940).
4. Ind. Acts 1919, c. 59, §33, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) 64-513;
Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind. (1935) 273; Ops. Att'y. Gen., Ind. (1938) 150
and 269; Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind. (1941) 171; Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind.
(1942) 64. For an application of the same principle to a life es-
tate, see Mehne v. Dillon, 203 Ind. 346, 165 N.E. 908 (1932).
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 189); U.S. v. Alleg-
heny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
6. Compare Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111 (1944), Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission v. U.S., 319 U.S. 598 (1943), Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466 (1939), Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938), and James v.
Dravo, 302 U.S. 134 (1937), with Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401
(1937), Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), Childers
v. Beaver, 270 U.S. 555 (1926). But cf. U.S. v. Allegheny County,
322 U.S. 174 (1944); Mayo v. U.S., 319 U.S. 441. (1943). See
Powell, "The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities" (1945)
58 Harv. L. Rev. 631; Powell, "The Remnant of Intergovernmental
Tax Immunities" (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 757.
7. Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219 (1922); Northern Pacific Ry. v.
Traill County, 115 U.S. 600 (1885); Lincoln County v. Pacific Spruce
Corp., 26 F.(2d) 435 (C.C.A. 9th, 1928); U.S. v. Milwaukee, 100
Fed. 828 (E.D.Wisc., 1893).
8. S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 66 Sup. Ct. 749 (1946); Ken Realty Corp.
v. Johnson, 138 F.(2d) 809 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943); Bancroft Invest-
ment Corp v. Jacksonville, 27 So.(2d) 162 (Fla. 1946).
9. "An indirect and remote advantage to government, such as the
probability that the services of contractors may be gotten by gov-
ernment for less if their pay is untaxed, or that public property
may be sold foi more if exempted for a time, will not justify the
extension of the immunity to the contractors or purchaser." Ken
19471
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under a conditional sales contract, is based on the entire value of such
interest.1o Similarly, where the leasehold is separated from the rever-
sion, assessment is on the entire value of the lessee's interest."l In
neither case does the assessment affect or include any interet of the
owner of the fee.12
In the absence of specific exemption by federal statute, no greater
objection could be raised to state taxation of a leasehold interest in
property, held in fee by the federal government, than to state taxation
of the equitable interest of a purchaser, under a conditional sales con-
tract with the federal government. Therefore, it is reasonable to as-
sume that a state may tai a leasehold interest in property held in fee
by the federal government.
Realty Co. v. Johnson, 138 F.(2d) 809, 810 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943);
S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 66 Sup. Ct. 749, 756 (1946); accord, Ala-
bama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1(1941), 140 A.L.R. 615, 621
(1942).
10. "The whole equitable ownership is in the petitioner and the value
of that ownership may be ascertained on the basis of the full value
of the land." S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 66 Sup. Ct. 749, 756 and 757
(1946); accord, Bancroft Investment Corp. v. Jacksonville, 27 So.
(2d) 162 (Fla., 1946).
11. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 473, 55
P.(2d) 891 (1936); Chicago v. University of Chicago, 302 Ill. 455,
134 N.E. 723 (1922), 23 A.L.R. 244, 248 (1923); accord, U.S. v.
Erie County, 31 F. Supp. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
12. "No deduction need be made for the interest of the government
since that interest is for security purposes only and not beneficial
in nature." S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 66 Sup. Ct. 749, 756 (1946)
(conditional sale); "The unpaid money measures the interest of
the United States, which can neither be assessed nor sold." Ken
Realty Corp. v. Johnson, 138 F.(2d) 809, 812 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943)
(conditional sale); "The assessment was against the leasehold es-
tates alone, and not against the reversion, which was exempt, and
the assessment was limited to the leasehold and improvements."
Chicago v. University of Chicago, 302 Ill. 455, 460, 134 N.E. 723,
725 (1922), 23 A.L.R. 244, 248 (1923); Hammond Lumber Co. v.
Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 473, 55 P.(2d) 891 (1936) (lease-
hold).
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